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urope has been in crisis mode for more than five years now. There are signs that the 
eurozone (EZ) economy is recovering, but it is far from being back to normal (see 
Figure 1, below).  
Figure 1. The eurozone economy is still not back to normal 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
When we published an eBook on vox.eu in June 2010, just at the beginning of the EZ crisis, 
one of the authors, Charles Wyplosz, wrote:  
the Eurozone is levitating on the hope that European leaders will find a way to end 
the crisis and take steps to avoid future ones. Unless more is done, however, this 
levitation magic will wear off and the Eurozone crisis will resume its destructive, 
unpredictable path. 
Now, more than five years later, this prediction has turned out to be accurate. The situation 
was deteriorating until decisive steps were taken to stabilise financial markets. But many of 
the weaknesses and imbalances that caused the EZ crisis are still in evidence:  
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 many of Europe’s banks face problems of non-performing loans; 
 many are still heavily invested in their own nation’s public debt – a bind that means 
problems with banks threaten the solvency of the government and vice versa; 
 borrowers across the continent are vulnerable to the inevitable normalisation of 
interest rates that have been close to zero for years. 
If we want to understand the persistent under-performance of the EZ economy we need to 
look at what caused the EZ crisis in the first place.  
In a consensus narrative of the causes, we, along with 14 others, assert that in its origin, the 
EZ crisis should not be thought of as a government debt crisis – even though it evolved into 
one. It was a sudden-stop crisis with “monetary union characteristics” (See “Rebooting the 
Eurozone:  Step 1 – Agreeing a Crisis Narrative”). Most of our 14 co-authors also penned 
their individual views in the eBook.  
Causes of the EZ crisis 
In 2007, the eurozone was a crisis waiting to happen. During the early ‘good years’ of the 
euro – when most considered it as a good if not a great thing – massive imbalances built up, 
largely unnoticed. Indeed, at the time this was viewed as a positive feature, not as a flaw. Big 
capital flows from EZ core nations like Germany, France and the Netherlands to EZ 
periphery nations like Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece were taken as evidence that the 
euro was fostering real convergence between a slow-growing core and more dynamic 
periphery economies.  
The problem was that this meant that the periphery was relying on foreign lenders to cover 
the savings-investment gap. When the Global Crisis broke out in 2008, those foreign 
investors got cold feet. They stopped lending across borders.  
This triggered a “sudden stop with monetary-union characteristics”. That is, it did not – as in 
the case of Iceland – manifest itself as an abrupt implosion (see Danielsson, 2008). The EZ’s 
target system automatically prevented this. Rather, it showed up in rising risk premiums.  
 The abrupt end of capital flows raised concerns about the viability of banks and 
governments in nations dependent on foreign lending, i.e. those running current 
account deficits.  
 Slowing growth produced big deficits and rapidly increasing public debt ratios.  
 When things got bad enough, several governments had to take on some of their 
banks’ debt, thereby increasing national debt ratios even further.  
This is how a balance of payments crisis turned into a public debt crisis. 
Importantly, there is no good reason to view this as a classic case of profligate spending by 
governments (apart from in Greece).  
 With the exception of Greece, the nations that ended up with bailouts were not those 
with the highest debt-to-GDP ratios. 
 Belgium and Italy sailed into the crisis with public debts of about 100% of GDP and 
yet did not end up with Troika programmes. 
 Ireland and Spain, with ratios under 40%, needed bailouts. 
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Table 1. The build-up to a balance of payments crisis 
  
1999 to 2007  
(% of own GDP) 
Bank assets  
(% of GDP) % 
 
Cumulative 
current 
account 
balance 
Cumulative 
budget deficit 
2000 to 
2008 
increase 
(p.p.) 
Bank 
assets, 
2008 
Debt-GDP 
ratio, 2008 
Excess 
inflation 
(1999-2007) 
Portugal -96 -36 44% 262% 72 7.5 
Greece -84 -47 36% 173% 109 9.9 
Spain -60 2 121% 296% 39 9.2 
Ireland -21 14 464% 783% 43 11.6 
Italy -8 -26 85% 235% 102 1.8 
EZ -2 -17 94% 335% 69 0.0 
France 6 -23 180% 395% 68 -2.9 
Austria 16 -19 305% 379% 69 -3.2 
Germany 27 -19 18% 316% 65 -4.8 
Belgium 47 -5 83% 392% 92 -1.1 
NL 48 -5 -9% 375% 55 2.8 
Finland 61 33 101% 197% 33 -4.9 
Lux'g 98 23 -577% 2367% 14 5.5 
Sources: ECB and the European Commission. 
The real culprits were the large intra-EZ capital flows that occurred in the decade before the 
crisis. These imbalances baked problems into the EZ ‘cake’ that would spill over in the 2010s. 
All the nations stricken by the crisis were running current account deficits. None of those 
running current account surpluses were hit. 
Why EZ membership mattered: Crisis amplifiers 
Monetary union mattered since it allowed cross-border imbalances to get so big during the 
boom (‘within a monetary union current accounts do not matter’). But it also mattered when 
the cross-border flows suddenly stopped. The common payments system provided some 
automatic liquidity cushion (the famous TARGET imbalances), but incomplete institutional 
infrastructure amplified the initial loss of trust in the deficit nations in various ways. 
 EZ governments that ran into trouble had no lender of last resort. 
Without a lender of last resort, a small sustainability shock could be endlessly amplified due 
to the deadly helix of rising risk premiums and deteriorating budget deficits stemming from 
higher debt servicing costs. This debt-default-risk vortex pulled in Portugal and came close 
to pulling in Italy, Spain and Belgium. Even France and Austria drifted into debt vortexes at 
the height of the crisis. 
 The close links between EZ banks and national governments greatly amplified and 
spread the crisis. 
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This is the so-called ‘doom loop’ – the potential for a vicious feedback cycle between banks 
and their governments. It was one of the key reasons that a single surprise in Greece could 
escalate into a systemic crisis of historic proportions. 
 The predominance of bank financing transmitted bank problems to the wider 
economy. 
As the doom loop and slowing economy heightened uncertainty, investment suffered much 
more than in countries where bank financing is less central, such as in the US. This weakened 
economies, thus worsening the outlook for banks as well. 
Taken together, these features meant that their euro-denominated borrowing was akin to 
foreign currency debt in a traditional, developing nation ‘sudden stop’ crisis. 
 The other classic crisis response: devaluation, was impossible for euro-using nations.  
Moreover, the rigidity of factor and product markets made the process of restoring 
competitiveness slow and painful in terms of lost output. 
The whole situation was made much worse by poor crisis management. Mistakes were 
made, but above all there was nothing in the EZ institutional architecture to deal with a crisis 
on this scale. EZ leaders faced the dual challenge of fire-fighting and institution-building – 
all at a time when the interests of debtors and creditors diverged sharply and European 
electorates were following developments closely. 
Judging from market reactions, each policy intervention ‘saved the day’ but made things 
worse from the next day on. Only in the summer of 2012 was the corner turned with the 
decision to set up a banking union and the “whatever it takes” assertion by ECB President 
Mario Draghi. From then on the doom loop began to work in a positive sense: each reduction 
in risk spreads made banks and the economy stronger, thereby strengthening the fiscal 
position of the peripheral countries and justifying further reductions in risk premia. The 
large bond-buying programme of the ECB is another reason that financial market tensions 
have largely disappeared. 
Conclusion  
The fact that the doom loop has turned around for a while should not lead to complacency. 
The feedback mechanisms between weak sovereigns, banks and the economy still exist.  This 
is what we wrote in June 2010:  
The Eurozone ‘ship’ is holed below the waterline. The ECB actions are keeping it 
afloat for now, but this is accomplished by something akin to bailing the water as fast 
as it leaks in. European leaders must very soon find a way to fix the hole. 
It is time to put national differences aside and finish the job of restoring stability and 
prosperity in Europe. While the European flotilla may have run aground, it need not 
sink. But rescuing the Eurozone will require coordination, teamwork, and discipline. 
While important progress has been made with the banking union and new institutions like 
the ESM, it is still true that more needs to be done. We find ourselves at a quiet time; the EZ 
crisis is in remission. But when interest rates start to rise, or if confidence evaporates again 
due to global shock, the systemic cracks could reappear at an alarming rate.  
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